Chasing the region’s ‘grand bargain’

Follow

Chasing the region’s ‘grand bargain’

Illustrated by Marco Melgrati for Arab News
Illustrated by Marco Melgrati for Arab News
Short Url

The geopolitical landscape of 2025 has been dominated by President Donald Trump’s US and the ongoing agony of Gaza, along with its consequences in the region. Europe and its friends and allies in the Middle East have had to come to terms with the second Trump administration, which will be barely 25 percent fulfilled at the turn of the year.

A world order, built from the ashes of the 20th century’s European disasters and the diplomacy that followed, with its values base and postwar institutions, has run its current course. It will not disappear but inevitably it will be reshaped by this past year and the next few to come. It will be built on transactions with, and accommodation of, an uncertain leading figure, but its outline is becoming clearer and it ought to allow some reasonable prediction and forecasting.

No one scoffs now at the concept of “the art of the deal” being applied to issues that have occupied old-school diplomacy for decades. It may not be likeable but it accurately describes where we are.

The year opened with a unilateral readjustment of US trade tariffs, to be applied according to a formula whose precision was unclear. It did not much matter, as renegotiation was not built on any formula but on how the president’s demands could be accommodated. It was an accurate foretaste of what was to come.

Gaza stands as testimony to this change. In the first place, Oct. 7, 2023, and all that followed could easily be labeled as “the failure of absolutely everything” in diplomatic terms. Decades of traditional activity had neither resolved the issue of Palestinian self-determination, nor of Israel’s security. Trump’s challenges, firstly the extraordinary “Riviera” plan, then by the end of the year the ceasefire, the Board of Peace and the 20-point way forward, have forced the hand of all those with an interest in the issue.

Perhaps the most decisive event affecting US diplomacy was Israel’s extraordinary attack on Doha.

Alistair Burt

“You tell me it’s not the answer,” he might say to the doubters, of which there are many, “but what have you got?” And it was a deliberate irony that he chose to confirm his plan via a UN Security Council resolution — perhaps the defining symbol of diplomatic failure over the years and a venue usually reserved for the president’s disdain.

2025 confirmed what many believed on Oct. 7, 2023: that everything that followed the original atrocity would compound it into catastrophe and that we were in whole new territory, militarily and diplomatically. Gaza is laid waste, hundreds of thousands are dead or displaced, and Israel’s stock in the world has plummeted to new lows, from widespread public polling to governmental reaction.

This new world has wider consequences, not least on long-term relationships. Nations such as the UK, France and other long-time allies of Israel have recognized the state of Palestine and been accused by Tel Aviv of supporting terror in doing so. But for many nations, not least in the Global South, the failure of many of Israel’s allies to condemn the nature of its warfare, or to back legal redress through resolute support for international legal agencies, smacks of double standards and has provided a stick with which to beat the West in many other forums and on other issues. This will have a lasting impact.

Some relationships have proved more enduring. No Arab state that signed up to the Abraham Accords with Israel has broken from them, despite a recognition that the nature of the conflict has outraged millions across the region. Longer-term interests, such as pursuing a new Middle East into which Israel, with its economy, technology and security expertise, would fit, have held firm. But this is not the same as believing that nothing has changed.

The failure of the accords to take Palestinian issues fully into account as the region looked forward looks unlikely to be repeated. The sharp criticism of Israel’s actions by some Abraham Accords states, plus what appears now to be an unwavering determination by Saudi Arabia to resist any calls for “normalization” without the clearest path to a Palestinian state, seems destined to be at the heart of regional relationships in the future.

Those of us that believed the “new territory” post-Oct. 7 would include the relegation of the West and the increasing influence of significant regional actors in resolving issues were only partially correct. Europe, both EU nations and those outside, have struggled for a place on the stage, but the US is back — for now.

Ever since the uncertainty of Barack Obama’s red lines on Syria, the region has had to account for a different relationship with a less engaged US. The Gaza proposition, and the support of Israel’s attack on Iran, has altered that calculation. But perhaps the most decisive event affecting US diplomacy was not any action of its own at all, but Israel’s extraordinary attack on the mediation efforts going on in Doha on Sept. 9. The repercussions of this — in terms of the president’s evident outrage, which drove his determination to bring a rapid end to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war in Gaza — marked a shift in a hitherto unbreakable relationship between the US and Israel.

Coupled with a loss of support for that unblinking alliance among “Make America Great Again” supporters in the US, this shift may not be temporary. But it cannot be taken for granted and urgent work is required.

Trump’s anger was clearly shared by regional Gulf states. In the perceptive analysis of one of the region’s leading figures, Gulf states have in recent decades gone from dependency to agency and now to leadership. They are not going back. Already shaken by Iranian reprisals on Doha as an element of the brief exchange with Israel, Sept. 9 will have confirmed that no regional state is currently safe from an unexpected aggressive action — and perhaps also reaffirmed that there is no peace in the region without a comprehensive resolution of issues.

Is the “grand bargain” back on the table? Gaza, Iran’s changed situation, the fall of the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s taming in Lebanon all present opportunities, but also obvious risks to the region of further instability and violence, ruining the model to which most aspire. There is now a real urgency for those in leadership in the region to take action to ensure that states do not fracture, that militias are not funded to seize the moment and that aggressive state actors remove their threats.

And there is the added incentive that the chance of delivering a successful grand bargain would surely keep Trump’s attention and involvement.

If the opportunity for stability is not realized, other partnerships will be less effective than they might be. The EU’s well-intentioned Pact for the Mediterranean, launched recently, has received lukewarm support, with a history of underachievement of such grand schemes. But it and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor mark a genuine effort to share the benefits of new artificial intelligence technology, energy development and contemporary connectivity. The second China-Arab States Summit will be held in China in 2026, as Beijing safeguards itself against potential Western reprisals for its activities, cementing its growing investment across the region in energy and power, finance and nuclear technology.

Gulf Cooperation Council gross domestic product and its consumer spending are immensely positive and attractive — but all at risk if security fails.

The horror of the Gaza landscape is a reminder, as if one were needed, of what happens if unresolved issues in the region are allowed to fester in the belief that “management” is a more successful policy than leadership and action. Against all odds, it is essential that 2026 is the year that opportunities are taken, not added to the catalogue of lost chances of the past.

  • Alistair Burt is a former UK member of Parliament who has twice held ministerial positions in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; as parliamentary undersecretary of state from 2010 to 2013 and as minister of state for the Middle East from 2017 to 2019.

X: @AlistairBurtUK

Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point of view