Iraq’s postelection political bargaining, external pressure

On Nov. 12, a day after Iraq’s seventh national elections, the Independent High Electoral Commission announced the results by party. The Reconstruction and Development coalition, headed by incumbent Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, won 46 seats in the 329-member national assembly. Other major winners were the State of Law coalition of former PM Nouri Al-Maliki, which obtained 29 seats, and the Taqaddum party of Sunni leader Mohammed Al-Halbousi, which won 27 seats. Out of the 40 parties in the fray, the top nine won 221 seats, with 61 percent of the popular vote, while the remaining 31 parties got 108 seats.

Community-wise, the Shiite parties got 187 seats, the Sunnis 77 seats and the Kurds 56 seats. But these community groups are not united; they consist of several competing factions, while seeking to bolster their numbers by negotiating alliances with factions from other communities.

On Dec. 29, the assembly took its first crucial step in the postelection process by electing the speaker, Haibet Al-Halbousi, from the Sunni grouping. The next step will be the election of the president by a two-thirds majority of the assembly, which will be followed by the president calling on the leader of the coalition with majority support to form the government as prime minister.

At the center of the electoral process is the Coordination Framework, which brings together most of the Shiite parties. Given its crucial role in government formation, Al-Sudani, who had fought the elections with his separate coalition, has now found it prudent to rejoin the Coordination Framework and attempt to influence it to uphold his claim to be prime minister for a second term. But Al-Maliki is now leading the opposition to Al-Sudani’s second term.

This is not surprising. The Coordination Framework seeks to ensure that the PM is amenable to its influence and, when in position, does not become so strong as to challenge the group. Commentator Shahla Al-Kli says that the prime minister is viewed by the Coordination Framework not as a political leader but as “an executive tasked with implementing a preagreed Shiite elite consensus.”

The process of government formation in Iraq is also being influenced by three external players — Iran, the US and Turkiye. Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, Iran has exerted its influence in the country by patronizing Shiite politicians and supporting diverse Shiite militias. While Iraqi law requires that these militias disarm themselves, many of them have retained their weapons and their autonomy from state control. They have also done well in the latest elections, getting about 50 seats.

The Coordination Framework seeks to ensure that the PM is amenable to its influence and does not challenge it. 

Talmiz Ahmad

In the background of the diminution of Iranian influence in the aftermath of the Gaza war, the US approach seems to have become more insistent and demanding. In October, President Donald Trump appointed Mark Savaya, an Iraqi-origin American, as the US special envoy for Iraq. Savaya has said that his goal is to “make Iraq great again.” To this end, he has publicly called for the disarming of militias and the end of Iranian influence in Iraqi politics, pointing out that this would restore Iraqi sovereignty and business attractiveness.

The US has also signaled it could use coercive measures to get its way, including threats of strikes on militia facilities and sanctions on Iraqi banks and businesses. A senior US State Department official has stated that the US government would not deal with government bodies that are headed by persons from armed militias (described as “terrorist groups”). Given that control over government departments is a major source of revenue for the militias, a successful American effort to dismantle their influence could, according to commentator Ronen Zeidel, “fundamentally alter the power balance within Iraqi politics.”

This might not be readily achieved. Given its weakened state, Iran might not actively seek to promote its own candidate as prime minister. Instead, taking advantage of its deep links with diverse Iraqi power centers, it might safeguard its strategic interests through engagements with the Coordination Framework, where it has substantial support bases and allies.

Turkiye, the third influential external factor in Iraqi affairs, has close ties with the Irbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party that did very well in the elections in terms of both popular vote (over 1 million) and seats won. Despite opposition from the central government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party could seek to control the supply of its oil to Turkiye through the Iraq-Turkiye pipeline, in return for supporting the Turks confronting the Kurds in northeast Syria by blocking the flow of Syrian Kurds to sanctuaries in Iraq’s Kurdish region.

As of now, Iraqi affairs seem to be on the cusp of uncertainty due to sharp competitions among domestic and external players. However, though the latest elections could throw up some new faces, basically, in the political order, there is more continuity than change. This has led to broad-based disenchantment among Iraqis about the electoral process, as reflected in the diminishing turnout in every election since 2005.

Not surprisingly, as the country has become more stable, popular expectations from governance have increased. However, the electoral process continues to throw up the same leaders spending billions of dollars to obtain political power and then colluding with each other for personal enrichment and backing the agendas of rival external players. Two decades since its first democratic elections, Iraq is still seeking a political order that serves the people’s interests.

• Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.