Between illusions of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Middle East

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the latest US-Israeli war with Iran may have pushed the Middle East into its most dangerous phase since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. More than another regional clash, it has exposed the limits of American power, the reach of Israeli deterrence, Iran’s position in the regional balance, and the resilience of the Gulf security structure.

At the same time, the war has demonstrated that talk of a “new Middle East” does not necessarily mean a more stable one. It may instead signal a region that is more exposed, more fragmented and more volatile. This conflict may not produce a new regional order as much as it may generate broader instability and prolong the life of the region’s crises rather than resolve them.

The core problem with the American vision accompanying this war lies in an assumption that has been repeated since the Iraq war: that toppling, or severely weakening, the center of hostile power will automatically pave the way for a regional order more compatible with American interests.

This assumption shaped Donald Trump’s decision to resort to force rather than diplomacy. The wager was clear: Israeli-American strikes against Iran’s leadership and military infrastructure would either trigger an uprising or at least leave Iran weakened and preoccupied with its internal crises, to the point where it could no longer threaten the region.

This conflict may not produce a new regional order as much as it may prolong the life of the region’s crises

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

But weakening Iran does not necessarily stabilize the region. Iran is not merely a regime to be removed and replaced. It is a state with strong institutions, a complex social fabric and influence across several Arab arenas. Its collapse could open the door to even larger problems.

In practice, the war quickly moved beyond the framework of limited strikes and evolved into a multifront regional conflict. Iranian attacks have expanded to include Israel, American bases and targets across the Gulf. The consequences were immediately reflected in global energy markets, maritime routes and international trade.

Major pipelines, terminals and refineries were suddenly placed at risk, with disruptions or partial shutdowns reported at vital sites in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Iraq and Bahrain. Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes, has come under enormous pressure.

The larger point is that the Middle East is shaped not only by military balances but by the vulnerability of the global economy to Gulf instability. Any major disruption there quickly reaches prices, shipping, insurance and financial markets.

In the Gulf, the war has exposed the fragility of a security model built for decades on American protection. US bases are no longer seen only as shields but also as magnets for danger. That doubt, which has been deepened by the war, had roots in earlier shocks, including the 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco, when the heart of Saudi energy infrastructure was struck without a direct American military response.

The central question is no longer simply whether Washington can protect the Gulf, but whether reliance on Washington now also increases Gulf exposure. This shift was visible even before the current war, including in the Saudi-Iran detente brokered by China in March 2023.

Yet this war has not merely halted this quiet diplomatic track, it has exposed its limits. No matter how significant diplomatic de-escalation may be, it cannot erase the realities of military geography. As long as American bases remain in the Gulf and Iran continues to perceive its security as existentially threatened, Gulf states will remain within the line of fire, whether they wish to be or not.

Therefore, the most realistic expectation is not a Gulf rupture with Washington but rather a redefinition of the relationship — less automatic reliance, more realistic expectations, greater efforts to build strategic room for maneuver with powers such as China and Russia, and perhaps stronger investments in local defense capabilities.

Meanwhile, despite the heavy blows it has suffered, Iran does not appear likely to disappear from the region’s emerging strategic landscape. It may emerge militarily weaker, internally strained and less capable of projecting influence abroad in the same way as before. But that does not mean it will vanish from the equation.

On the contrary, Iran may seek to compensate for its losses through its traditional strategy: asymmetric warfare, expanding the costs of conflict for its adversaries, and using geography, energy, economics and maritime chokepoints as alternative tools of deterrence. Iran’s strategy is not based solely on direct military confrontation but also on exposing the fragility of the American-led regional security system and turning the US military presence in the region into a burden for its allies.

No matter how significant diplomatic de-escalation may be, it cannot erase the realities of military geography

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

This inevitably raises questions about Israel’s position in the new regional landscape. Israel will clearly emerge from the war having reaffirmed its intelligence and air superiority and its ability to strike deep inside Iran. Yet such superiority does not automatically translate into a stable regional order under Israeli leadership.

A weaker Iran could, paradoxically, heighten Arab anxiety about an Israel that appears more unconstrained. The regional map is therefore not simply weak Iran versus strong Israel, but a triangle of an injured yet enduring Iran, a stronger yet unsettling Israel and a wealthy but less confident Gulf.

Between these three poles, other regional actors will maneuver according to their interests. Turkiye will seek openings, Egypt will try to prevent regional chaos and protect trade and energy routes, and Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen will remain arenas where the conflict reverberates.

Beyond the region, war in Iran absorbs American attention and resources, creates space for Russia and China elsewhere, and risks weakening Ukraine by diverting US focus and support. In that sense, it may further erode America’s ability to manage multiple major crises at once.

For all these reasons, talk of a new Middle East requires caution. What is emerging is not a stable new order but a more fluid region in which American deterrence looks less absolute, Gulf confidence in outside protection is weaker and military pressure on Iran has not produced a safer balance.

The war has not created a new Middle East. But it has shattered many assumptions behind the old one.

• Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. He is the author of “The Copts: An Investigation into the Rift between Muslims and Copts in Egypt.” X: @ALMenawy