Arakan Army’s new offensive leaves Rohingya on the brink

Over the past week, the Arakan Army has launched a fresh offensive across key parts of northern Rakhine State, tightening its grip over territory that was once contested. In doing so, it has fundamentally altered the political and humanitarian landscape for the Rohingya. This latest escalation has been overshadowed by international attention on other global crises, but for nearly 1 million Rohingya refugees trapped in Bangladesh, and for those still inside Rakhine, it marks one of the most consequential turning points since their mass expulsion in 2017.

For years, the Arakan Army has been steadily advancing against Myanmar’s junta, positioning itself as the dominant force in Rakhine. But the gains made in recent days, including new positions around Buthidaung and Maungdaw, alongside communication blackouts and intensified clashes, consolidate not only its military control but also its political authority over the areas where the Rohingya once lived in significant numbers.

The consequences of this shift reach far beyond battlefield maps. They speak directly to whether repatriation of the Rohingya is still possible, to whether humanitarian access can be preserved and to whether Bangladesh can afford to continue relying on the same failing diplomatic script.

The first and most urgent issue is what this means for repatriation. For years, Dhaka and international actors insisted that any return of the Rohingya to Myanmar would be negotiated through Naypyitaw. Yet, today, the junta controls only a fraction of Rakhine. The Arakan Army now holds most of the townships that matter for repatriation. In practice, this means that the future of the Rohingya in their homeland now depends more on the decisions of the Arakan Army than on the junta or even the national unity government.

The future of the Rohingya in their homeland now depends more on the decisions of the Arakan Army than on the junta

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

And the Arakan Army has made its position painfully clear. It does not recognize the term “Rohingya” and views the community as either foreign or politically aligned with the central state. Even when the group has signaled pragmatic openness to discussing returns, it has simultaneously imposed harsh restrictions on identity and movement. Its expanding territorial control therefore raises a troubling question: If the authority that commands the ground rejects the Rohingya’s very existence as a people, who exactly is going to guarantee their rights and safety upon their return?

This is the heart of the matter. Repatriation is not simply a logistical challenge about moving people across borders. It is a political challenge about who controls the land, who writes the laws and who decides who belongs. The Arakan Army’s new offensive cements its role as the de facto government of Rakhine. Without its buy-in to a rights-based framework, repatriation risks becoming either a hollow gesture or a dangerous return to conditions that precipitated genocide in the first place.

The second major consequence concerns the humanitarian crisis. The Rohingya inside Rakhine are already in acute danger. They face extortion, movement restrictions, coerced labor and periodic violence from both the junta and various local armed actors. The new offensive has increased civilian displacement, blocked key aid routes and worsened the already fragile environment for humanitarian organizations. When communications go down and fighting intensifies, the Rohingya become invisible, unprotected and uncounted.

For the nearly 1 million Rohingya in Bangladesh, the situation is no better. The camps in Cox’s Bazar are now entering their eighth year of operation, transforming from temporary shelters into sites of generational stagnation. Aid cuts have reduced rations to historically low levels. Criminal networks and armed groups recruit openly. Malnutrition is rising and despair is becoming entrenched. The Arakan Army’s advances in Rakhine make it even harder for Bangladesh to sustain the narrative that returns are imminent. If anything, the prospect of the Rohingya returning is now more remote than at any point in the past decade.

And this leads to the third consequence, the strategic recalculation now forced upon Bangladesh. Dhaka has spent years relying on two pillars: international pressure on Myanmar’s military and bilateral repatriation agreements signed with a junta that never had the capacity or intention to implement them. With the Arakan Army now effectively running most of Rakhine, both pillars have collapsed. Bangladesh must confront a new reality. The junta is no longer the primary power in the region that matters most for Rohingya return.

If anything, the prospect of the Rohingya returning is now more remote than at any point in the past decade

Dr. Azeem Ibrahim

This leaves Dhaka with difficult choices. Does it open a quiet channel to the Arakan Army, despite the group’s revisionist rhetoric and its opaque political agenda? Does it engage the national unity government more deeply, even though it lacks territorial control? Or does it wait, hoping the battlefield dynamics shift again, risking indefinite prolongation of one of the world’s most protracted refugee crises?

Whatever path Dhaka chooses, inaction is no longer an option. The Rohingya are not a static population. Their crisis is evolving and the conditions on the ground in Myanmar are shaping their future far more quickly than Bangladesh’s policy formulations. With rising insecurity in the camps and dwindling international attention, Bangladesh must develop a strategy that reflects the realities of who governs Rakhine today, not who governed it eight years ago.

Regionally, this moment is also critical for stability. Rakhine State borders major trade routes and sits adjacent to Bangladesh’s vulnerable coastline. Instability in Rakhine has already spilled across borders through refugee flows, trafficking networks and criminal activity. As the Arakan Army strengthens its position, neighboring states, including Bangladesh, India and China, will face new uncertainties over migration, insurgency and cross-border violence. The window to shape future dynamics is closing quickly.

The world often treats the Rohingya crisis as if it is frozen in time, anchored to the atrocities of 2017. But the situation today is deeply dynamic. The Arakan Army’s latest offensive is not just another battle in Myanmar’s long civil war, it is a shift in authority over a region whose future will determine whether the Rohingya ever see a path home. It is a shift that deepens humanitarian suffering and tests the viability of every plan that has been proposed since their forced displacement. And it is a shift that compels Bangladesh and the wider region to rethink their assumptions before the crisis becomes truly irreversible.

The Rohingya cannot endure another cycle of international neglect. The new reality in Rakhine must be acknowledged, confronted and addressed. Their future depends on decisions being made now, in the aftermath of this offensive, not in some distant future when it is too late.

• Dr. Azeem Ibrahim is the director of special initiatives at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington, DC. X: @AzeemIbrahim