The world after the Strait of Hormuz crisis

The Strait of Hormuz crisis is no longer merely a regional confrontation tied to tensions between Iran and the US, or between Tehran and Israel. It has evolved into a defining moment that reveals the nature of the emerging world order. Maritime corridors are not just geographic details on international trade maps; they are direct instruments in the struggle for influence and are among the most powerful tools of political and economic pressure in the 21st century.
Yet the most significant development in recent days has not simply been the continuing tension in the Strait of Hormuz itself, but what emerged from the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. The mere fact that “keeping Hormuz open” became a central issue in a US-China summit means the strait is no longer just a Middle Eastern matter. It has become an issue tied to the reshaping of the global order itself.
What is particularly striking is that Beijing, despite its traditional reluctance to become directly involved in regional crises, has found itself compelled to engage in discussions about the security of the strait. China remains the country most dependent on energy flows coming from the Gulf. It was therefore hardly surprising that American reports suggested Beijing is considering increasing imports of US oil to reduce its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.
This is where the real transformation becomes visible: the Hormuz crisis is not simply a dispute over “closing the strait.” It is a struggle over who has the power to redefine maritime geography.
And this is what the new Iranian interpretation of the strait reveals.
Iran’s recently leaked vision of the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a geographic adjustment. It reflects a profound shift in Tehran’s strategic doctrine. More importantly, it represents a highly consequential transformation because it moves the concept of control from a narrow passage to a broad maritime sphere. In practical terms, Iran is attempting to turn a vast area stretching hundreds of kilometers into a zone of military and security influence, granting itself the right to monitor, inspect, control, threaten and even redefine what it considers “legitimate maritime security.”
Iran no longer views the strait simply as a narrow waterway between the Iranian and Omani coasts. Instead, it sees it as a broad operational zone extending from the Iranian port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman all the way to Sirri Island inside the Arabian Gulf.
The political message is unmistakable. Tehran wants to impose a new reality in which it becomes the actor capable of setting the rules of navigation and energy flows across both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
In this sense, the Iranian message is directed primarily at the US and the Gulf states.
Iran’s expansion of the concept of the “Hormuz zone” to include the Gulf of Oman effectively means that the alternatives countries have been trying to develop as bypasses to the strait are no longer outside the circle of tension or presumed Iranian influence.

The US has discovered that protecting freedom of navigation is far more difficult today than it was in previous decades.

Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy

In effect, Tehran is saying: “There are no true bypasses beyond our reach.” This is where the nature of the conflict changes.
The world is no longer dealing with a closed passage that can simply be reopened through military force. Instead, it is confronting a more complex form of what could be described as graduated maritime coercion — the creation of a permanent environment of uncertainty and risk that is capable of disrupting markets and driving up the costs of energy, shipping and insurance, even without a formal closure.
This is why the major powers are learning a critical lesson: controlling strategic chokepoints no longer requires a traditional military blockade. Sustained uncertainty alone can achieve much of the same effect.
That lesson is already reshaping international policy.
On the military front, there has been a renewed emphasis on international naval coalitions, escort missions, mine-clearing operations, drones and maritime surveillance systems. The US has also begun promoting initiatives such as “Project Freedom” to guarantee the safe passage of ships and protect international navigation.
At the same time, however, the crisis has also exposed the limits of military power.
Despite its overwhelming naval superiority, the US has discovered that protecting freedom of navigation in the era of precision missiles, drones and smart naval mines is far more difficult and costly than it was in previous decades. America’s Western allies have also shown clear hesitation about becoming fully involved in a direct maritime confrontation with Iran.
Meanwhile, China is moving in a completely different direction.
Beijing does not want a military confrontation in the Gulf but it understands that its heavy reliance on energy passing through the Strait of Hormuz represents a major strategic vulnerability. This is why, for years, China has used its Belt and Road Initiative to construct networks of roads, ports, railways and energy corridors to reduce its economy’s exposure to maritime chokepoints.
The Strait of Hormuz therefore becomes part of a much larger struggle: a contest between two competing models for managing the world.
The American model relies on securing maritime routes through military power and security alliances. The Chinese model seeks to reduce dependence on those same routes through infrastructure, economic connectivity and diversified energy supplies.
Perhaps the most important outcome of the Trump-Xi meeting was their shared recognition that the global economy has become so fragile that any maritime disruption can rapidly evolve into a worldwide crisis.
Yet the greatest irony is that the more the world tries to protect maritime corridors, the more convinced it becomes of the need to reduce dependence on them altogether.
This is why we are now witnessing two parallel trends: greater militarization and securitization of maritime routes, and greater investment in land-based alternatives, clean energy and strategic storage.
Saudi Arabia is expanding pipelines toward the Red Sea. The UAE is reinforcing Fujairah. China is building overland corridors. Europe is accelerating its transition toward renewable energy. Even Arctic routes are beginning to enter long-term calculations about the future of global trade.
And yet reality remains more complicated.
The world can partially work around oil disruptions but it still lacks large-scale alternatives for liquefied natural gas, which remains heavily dependent on the Strait of Hormuz, especially for Qatar and the UAE. This means the strait is unlikely to lose its importance anytime soon. But over time, it may gradually lose its ability to hold the world hostage.
That is why the Strait of Hormuz crisis may prove to be more than just another Gulf crisis. It may instead mark the beginning of a new phase in the history of the international order. A phase defined not simply by who controls territory but by who controls the flow of energy, trade and the arteries of the global economy.

• Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. He is the author of “The Copts: An Investigation into the Rift between Muslims and Copts in Egypt.” X: @ALMenawy