The need to restore the Gulf front

The Arab Gulf states face security and existential challenges that may be greater than anything they have experienced before, including the Iraq-Iran War and the occupation of Kuwait. At that time, the world was clearer and more biased, whereas today, relying solely on alliances, agreements or war technologies is not enough.

Systematic Iranian aggression against the six Gulf states will not end with the end of the war; it may just be the beginning. This aggression is currently driving increased armament and strengthening self-reliance, alongside the emergence of new alliances.

It is likely that the war with Iran will be the last American war in the region. Since achieving oil self-sufficiency, Washington has sought to withdraw, a process started by Barack Obama, discussed by Joe Biden and now pursued by Donald Trump.

Among the consequences of this vacuum is the return of competing regional alliances and axes, such as Islamabad and Ankara. If the goal is to deter Iran and achieve regional balance, are they capable of doing so? The Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement is bilateral, not an axis, and is based on military cooperation. Turkiye is not willing to confront Iran, as it enjoys the NATO umbrella and a military relationship with the US, and will not let its alliance draw it into a confrontation with Tehran.

Due to Iran’s continuous aggression against the Gulf states, they will seek to create a new deterrence system

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

If the aggressive policy of Iran — whose orientation under the new leadership cannot yet be judged — continues, it will push Gulf states toward cooperation with Israel. Let us not forget that Tehran was the reason for the American Fifth Fleet’s arrival in the Gulf after it targeted oil tankers. Its threats are also behind the proliferation of foreign military bases and agreements.

In the war crisis since February, there has been a complex regional conflict triangle: Iran, the Gulf and Israel. Due to Iran’s continuous aggression against the Gulf states, they, in turn, will seek to create a new deterrence system to fill the vacuum, should the US sign a nonaggression pact with Tehran.

We cannot judge Iran’s intentions until it matches its words with actions. Will it end its “pincer movement” that threatens the security of Gulf states in the north and south? This would require it to abandon its militias in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

In this war, Iran has resorted to retaliating against Gulf states — every time it fails to confront Israel in Lebanon or fears retaliation from the US in Gulf waters. This may push the Gulf states to form alliances, even with the devil.

Iranian aggression has contributed to rapprochements and reduced disagreements among Gulf Cooperation Council members, but they have not ended them. With the growing Iranian threat, which may intensify further after the war, they will find themselves forced to rebuild their front to repel the danger.

What is the motivation for this skeptical and cautious thinking? Do Gulf states fear that the Iranians and Americans will reach an agreement at their expense? It is unlikely that the negotiations will contain anything Washington could concede to them. More likely, the Iranian negotiators will seek to reassure the Gulf that they will not be targeted after the end of the war. With the new reality, Iran will try to compensate for its significant regional losses, perhaps by adopting a compensatory policy for Lebanon and Syria.

With the growing Iranian threat, the GCC members will find themselves forced to rebuild their front to repel the danger

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

We see this compensatory positioning in Tehran’s insistence on extending its control over the Strait of Hormuz to threaten its adversaries and in its holding Gulf states hostage in every crisis with the US and Israel. This appears to be an attempt to strengthen its leverage after losing Syria, Gaza and Lebanon. These areas were previously used to assert geopolitical balance. Here, its control over the strait and the endangerment of Gulf states’ security will represent a major threat, forcing the western Gulf to create another reality to confront it.

We can anticipate a “peace” agreement with the US, most likely based on an exchange of commitments. Washington’s primary demand is for Iran to end its nuclear program, while Tehran stipulates an American commitment not to attack it. This is the same condition with Israel, which will not accept anything less than the dismantling of Hezbollah to end the Iranian encirclement.

We cannot rule out that the negotiators will agree on Iran committing not to repeat its aggression against the Gulf states, but this will not prevent it from continuing to be a source of indirect geopolitical threat to the Gulf, retaining the weapons of the strait and its proxies.

There will be no way to compel Tehran to fulfill its commitments other than through counterforce, which will require Gulf states to move to a new phase of reconciliation and cooperation. The GCC states collectively possess geographical depth, regional military agreements and financial power, which together total more than $4 trillion.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al-Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published.

X: @aalrashed