One religious or ethnic group cannot rule Iraq
The components of social and political structures have always been the same in Iraq since its establishment and more specifically after the Ba’ath party became the only ruling political entity in Iraq. Those structural elements have always been based on sectarian lines — Sunni, Shiite and Kurds — which have been typically associated with variable regional political influence of Iran, Turkey, Syria and Arab countries.
Successive Iraqi governments, including the current government of Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, have been aware of theses external factors and have consequently recognized their importance in managing their internal and regional policies. Former President Saddam Hussein had made it a ritual to receive Shiite religious leaders in his office to send a message that Shiite population supports him and shows solidarity with his Sunni leadership.
The US invaded Iraq in 2003 in coordination with the Shiite opposition, who claimed that Shiites were treated as second-class citizens in their own country. Eventually Shiite-led government took over the reins of power in the country.
Probably one of the advantages, if any, of Saddam’s rule was his capability to conceal the Shiite enraged negative sentiment toward Sunnis, including Sunni governments. This explosive sentiment against Sunnis in the region has found its way in the heated debates and discourse among Shiites, including believers, religious scholars and political pundits. Shiite-dominated local media aired and published theses attitudes, indicating a deeply entrenched religious conflict between both sects.
Had these inflamed negative sentiments been expressed by Shiites during the reign of Saddam and become known to Sunni Arab governments and people, they might have realized the importance of supporting a friendly Sunni government in Iraq. But clearly, this sectarian idea of Sunni/Shiite was neither there in Saddam Hussein’s mind nor in the thinking of Arab Sunni governments as well the population. They viewed Shiite as part of the Arab world and the Muslim Ummah, who had no animosity toward Sunnis.
Conversely, subsequent behaviors of the Shiite-led governments in Iraq have shown their social and political prejudices against anything that is Sunni. Although the public trial of Saddam that was aired on all Arab satellite networks sent a Western political message to all Arab governments — the trial — described by human rights organizations as unfair — showcased the Shiite penchant for vengeance.
Much hasn’t changed in Iraq with respect to its internal and regional politics. However, amid a fragile political balance in Baghdad, the sectarian tone has increased significantly, which prompted states — such as Syria, Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf states — that weren’t directly involved in the politics of Iraq to deepen their political engagement effectively in the Iraqi politics to protect their increasing interests in this country.
Now, Iraq is back to square one with regard to the social determinants of Iraq’s internal and regional politics and its future—Sunni, Shiite and Kurd ethnic groups. Majority Sunni population in Syria, which wasn’t directly involved in Iraqi politics, has revolted against the Shiite-led regime of President Bashar Assad. This revolt has emboldened the Iraqi Sunnis in neighboring provinces of Anbad and Ramadi to express their long-held grievances, especially in light the total collapse of the socioeconomic conditions, public services, security, as well as a dysfunctional government that cannot respond to the needs of both the Sunni and Shiite population.
Sunnis, specifically, claim that Nuri Al-Maliki’s government is targeting them as if they are second-class citizens or outsiders, which was the same claim employed by Shiites to dislodge the former Sunni government of Saddam Hussein. Sunni grievances also include abolishing the anti-terrorism law and the Justice and Accountability law (De-Baathification), especially the fourth clause of the anti-terrorism law.
The fourth clause defines terror act in vague terms, which facilitates for the government to detain anybody on the suspicion of engaging in a terror act. As a result of this controversial clause, 90 percent of the political prisoners are Sunnis, and that is a clear violation of their human rights and thus they must be released.
Moreover, that clause was used wrongfully by Al-Maliki to falsely accuse two prominent Sunni leaders of engaging in terror acts punishable by dearth penalty. Both Tariq Al-Hashimi (vice president) and Rafeh Al-Issawi (finance minister) got their houses raided by security forces and their bodyguards detained.
Another Sunni ethnic group, the Kurds, shared the same claim with Arab Sunnis that Al-Maliki is monopolizing the Iraqi government and not interested in power-sharing. These grievances are the main reasons for protests in Sunnis-dominated regions— Anbar and Ramadi. Al-Maliki’s responded to these demands by consolidating his grip on power by extending his authority over key government organizations, including security, intelligence, armed forces, finance, the central bank, the judiciary, de-Bathification and he added government media bodies to Afaq satellite television station owned by him. Such powers are not available to any government’s leader in the present world.
Iran, on the other hand, backs the Shiite-led government in both Iraq and Syria, in addition to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The success of the Syrian Free Army to topple Assad’s regime will subsequently undermine Iran’s influence in Iraq and Lebanon. Moreover, the possibility of uniting forces with Islamists in Syria and the Iraqi Sunni-dominated regions will change the balance of power in the entire Middle East region.
Eventually, Assad will be replaced, and in this situation the Iraqi government will not be able to rely on Iran’s total support for its existence. Muqtada Sadr and Ammar Al-Hakim, who are two prominent Shiite leaders, understood this fact and expressed solidarity with Sunni population in their demands.
Kurds, however, are playing a delicate political balance that focuses on promoting their political and economic objectives. Kurdistan province is rich with oil. So the Kurds have allied with the Arab Sunnis and supported their demands only to weaken the central government. By doing so, Kurdistan can have its total independence and rid itself legally and morally of its commitment to deal with Baghdad, which restricts its authority to sign independent agreements with foreign governments. Nonetheless, Kurdistan is intending to ally with Turkey by constructing a pipeline that could transfer two million barrels of oil a day to the Turkish port of Jihan. Also, it recently signed a deal with major oil companies, including Exxon Mobile and Chevron.
As the Iraqi politics polarizes in a sectarian direction, the regional interests would involve the Arab Sunni world, particularly the Gulf states and Egypt, who are not pleased with Iraqi Sunni conditions. These political realities are in the mind of Nuri Al-Maliki, which he stressed in his speech to commemorate the anniversary of the armed forces. In the speech, he said, “Regional competition and polarization exists in the region, and what is surrounding as, sectarian tension, is affecting Iraq badly.”
One can be infatuated with power and wealth as they are not easy to be either given up or shared easily. But running a government and its politics requires equal sharing of privileges. Nuri Al-Maliki should listen to his Shiite religious leaders Muqtada Sadr and Ammar Al-Hakim, and the former Iraqi Prime Minister and head of the Al-Iraqiyya coalition Ayad Allawi. These leaders have stressed that Iraq does not belong to one person and cannot be ruled by one religious sect or ethnic group. This fact is dictated by the Iraqi social and political realities as well as the geopolitical realities. One winner means a total demise of all.
Al_Zuhayyan@Yahoo.com
