Europe’s defense offers lessons for the Gulf

The building of EU military capacity has become something of a cyclical event. It appears and disappears with elections and the change of political leadership. French leader Jacques Chirac, at the beginning of his presidential term, put the topic at the forefront and reached a 1998 agreement with Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, to form a European military force. Fast forward to post-Brexit, and the two countries are now facing off over fishing quotas and illegal immigration. Who would have predicted this in 1998? Maybe Charles de Gaulle, who twice blocked UK entry to the nascent European Economic Community.

Yet this underlines the difficulty of building a regional military force. Today, the change in the political landscape in Germany has revitalized the topic of a broader European military integration. Indeed, numerous think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic are now analyzing the willingness of the new leadership in Germany to take a more active part in this project. It is interesting to notice that as political power changes in the Germany, France and Italy are cooperating more closely on the foreign affairs front.

I often see similarities between Europe and the Gulf, especially when it comes to foreign policy and regional security. The same dynamics can be found, yet each with their own local flavor. It also seems clear that military and security threats are increasingly similar. Both regions are faced with important questions on whether to build up a military force or at least a common architecture? Do they have the ability and capacity to make it? If so, what would be the initial principles needed to make it work?

The start for this endeavor must be on the political and sovereign side. Indeed, this can move forward only if a common foreign policy and security mechanism is in place. Europe or the Gulf cannot build up their military integration if there is a risk of a foreign policy clash among members. Therefore, a first step should be to investigate creating a more cohesive foreign policy decision-making process, as well as disagreement resolution one. The same should apply to security policies. I am not a military expert, but I would say that no leader will place sensitive defense manufacturing processes in another country if there is a risk of extended conflict with that same country.

It is hence an exceedingly difficult building process as it is ruled over by a dual sentiment. On one side, there is a true wish to build together and create a stronger and more cohesive bloc in the face of global challenges. And on the other side, there are constant risks and rivalries that exist naturally. This is one of the main weaknesses in building a common bloc — the need for so many governments and stakeholders to be onboard that it might end up hurting the sovereign and national interest of a country. And here lies the key to building any integrated regional military capacity: It needs be designed not as a replacement for national sovereignty but an extension of it.

I often see similarities between Europe and the Gulf, especially when it comes to foreign policy and regional security.

Khaled Abou Zahr

Europeans who call for the building of a EU military force always outline Europe’s dependence on the US or the need to stand against potential Russian aggression. Interestingly, those who oppose on purely nationalistic grounds, focus only on the dependence to the US. The narrative needs to change on all accounts. This can start by committing to core values and principles that are common to all. Stating what we stand for, rather than against who. Finally, other analysts who oppose the idea of a broader European military integration see a more important role for soft power. Yet, they fail to notice that without hard power, soft power has serious limits.

This renewed debate also comes at a time when the US has been disengaging from both Europe and the Middle East. Indeed, the US is less willing to commit to Europe, preferring an Anglo-Saxon approach that includes the UK and Australia, and is acting on its disengagement in the Middle East.

This might be the main reason both the EU and the Gulf need to build up their capacities and create a common architecture that will protect all. This architecture or alliance could then benefit from the support of the US in a consistent manner. This greater military integration would also mean broader responsibilities and the will to act autonomously in high-risk areas.

The US, in considering future threats, should revisit this concept and support this military architecture for both regions. It is especially true as it looks to rebalance its international military presence. The EU has had some successes in starting to build this greater integration, with various initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation. This could also serve as a case study for the Gulf region in developing a broader defense cooperation.

An inspiration for this next phase could indeed be de Gaulle, who despite withdrawing from NATO to build France’s own military and nuclear capacity, always stood by the Atlantic pact and remained a close ally to the US, while at the same time orchestrating a historic reconciliation within Europe that would support the building of the EU.

• Khaled Abou Zahr is chief executive of Eurabia, a media and tech company. He is also the editor of Al Watan Al Arabi.