The path to SDF integration into the Syrian state

Syria’s Defense Ministry on Tuesday declared a four-day ceasefire with the Syrian Democratic Forces, an announcement that coincided with a significant American policy signal. US envoy Tom Barrack stated that integration into the Syrian state — complete with “citizenship rights, cultural protection and political participation” — represents “the greatest opportunity for the Kurds in Syria right now.” He added that the SDF’s original anti-Daesh support mission has “largely expired” and emphasized America has “no interest in (a) long-term military presence in Syria.”
Barrack’s remarks clearly favored Damascus’ central government, likely surprising Kurdish expectations. They signal a recalibration of American engagement in post-Assad Syria, fundamentally reframing the SDF’s status from anti-Daesh combat force to a local faction expected to merge into state structures.
The EU adopted a similar stance, declaring that “the integration of military, security and civilian institutions into unified state frameworks, alongside meaningful political and local participation, is essential.” Brussels did stress, however, that “the full protection of Kurdish rights is also crucial” — seeking simultaneously to empower Damascus while preventing Kurdish marginalization.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry welcomed both the ceasefire and “the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces, encompassing all civilian and military institutions, into the Syrian state.” Riyadh commended “the efforts made by the United States of America in reaching this agreement,” while expressing hope for “strengthened security and stability, institutional development and the rule of law.”
The Saudi position reflects its consistent support for Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, while preventing the escalation of conflict into ethnically or sectarian-driven civil war.
Syria’s government last week moved to establish the legal-political foundations for integration through a presidential decree tackling core Kurdish grievances. The decree eliminated “exceptional measures” stemming from the controversial 1962 Hasakah census, extended citizenship “to all residents of Kurdish origin” — including previously unregistered individuals — and designated Nowruz as a nationwide paid public holiday.
These decisions demonstrate Damascus’ intent to offer more than military capitulation — instead proposing genuine citizenship free from cultural or ethnic bias against Kurds. The goal: making state reintegration an attractive, socially acceptable option within Kurdish communities, rather than a submission to a superior force.
Yet, despite these diplomatic and legislative initiatives, conditions on the ground remain volatile. Fighting resumed after an initial pause and gunfire exchanges continued, prompting Damascus to issue the four-day extension. Serious security concerns arose when 120 Daesh detainees escaped Al-Shaddadi prison during redeployment chaos — 81 were recaptured, according to Associated Press reports, though other Western sources cited higher figures.
The SDF has long justified its international standing by effectively managing the Daesh threat — controlling prisons, administering Al-Hol camp and combating extremist remnants. The prison break and associated risks to Syria and its neighbors, especially Iraq, directly challenge this security credibility. The notion of the SDF being a stable alternative faces scrutiny, particularly since Daesh threatens both Damascus and the SDF equally.
Three factors now define the SDF’s trajectory. First, American backing no longer guarantees its survival as a quasi-independent entity viewed by central authorities as separatist. Instead, Washington is applying pressure for state integration.

The SDF must recognize that integration into the state better serves Kurdish interests than separatist positioning.

Hassan Al-Mustafa

Second, regional endorsement for integration from Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Qatar increases the costs of reverting to being an armed militia operating outside state control. Integration, on the other hand, fits within a broader regional stability framework that emphasizes institution-building, sovereignty and territorial unity.
Third, Syria’s government must demonstrate its governance capacity domestically and internationally — managing the country effectively, ensuring stability, improving economic conditions and attracting investment. This requires tangible evidence that it can accommodate Kurdish diversity without triggering new cycles of rebellion. Damascus therefore prioritizes resolving the SDF question regardless of the perceived costs.
Real operational complications exist. Trust between Syria’s central authority and Kurdish communities remains tenuous. Yet transparent dialogue, unambiguous antidiscrimination legislation establishing citizenship as the baseline, and authentic representation across government, military, security services and state institutions would make SDF integration substantially more achievable.
Simultaneously, the SDF must abandon unrealistic aspirations of expansive Kurdish autonomy, recognizing that integration into the state with equal rights and genuine partnership better serves Kurdish interests than separatist positioning.

• Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher interested in Islamic movements, the development of religious discourse, and the relationship between Gulf Cooperation Council states and Iran. X: @Halmustafa