Everybody loses in Mali stalemate

There was a show on French television on Sunday, in which about eight children competed, singing the songs of a well-known artist who was present. At the end of the show, regardless of anything, the French presenter deliberated on the winner before screaming, “everybody won.” Today, in Mali, where the Russians, French and others compete for influence, we can say “everybody lost.”

The coordinated offensive launched last month by Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front, known as the FLA, and the Islamist extremist Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam wal-Muslimin struck several military positions in Mali, capturing Kidal. It was a major escalation of the conflict in the country’s north. More importantly, it was a clear sign that the country is drifting into chaos and risks becoming a dangerous no man’s land once again.

Historically, France has played a central military role in Mali and the wider Sahel. In 2013, under President Francois Hollande, France launched Operation Serval to stop the advance of extremist groups linked to Al-Qaeda toward Bamako. This swift intervention was successful and allowed for the recapture of the country’s north.

The north remained de facto dislocated from the central power, allowing nonstate actors to expand and take control

Khaled Abou Zahr

In 2014, France’s military action shifted into Operation Barkhane, which was a prolonged regional engagement. France stationed several thousand troops across the Sahel — mainly in five countries — to continue fighting nonstate actors that reflected transnational insurgencies. Yet, in 2022, despite tactical successes, the French forces were expelled.  

The breakdown in relations between France and Mali accelerated following the 2020 and 2021 coups led by the current president, Assimi Goita. Despite France’s efforts, insecurity spread during the years its military operated in the country and a strong anti-French sentiment grew. The state was fragile and weak and could not face these issues. This forced withdrawal marked the decline of the once-powerful French influence, with the same happening throughout the region, with real strategic shifts.

For Western powers, there is a common theme in Africa and perhaps beyond. They can quickly achieve military success most of the time. But they usually fail when it comes to achieving a lasting improvement in security or supporting the state-building efforts that are necessary. This is true of France’s decade-long intervention in Mali before the putsch. The state was weak and corrupt and little was done to stabilize the situation. The north remained de facto dislocated from the central power, allowing nonstate actors to expand and take control.

This situation was exploited by Russia, which was also looking to deepen its influence in Africa. Moscow’s first real direct involvement took place following the 2021 coup. Goita looked toward Russia and, more specifically, the Wagner Group for support with his internal security operations and, hence, to secure his hold on power.

The French withdrawal at the end of Operation Barkhane made Wagner the main security and military partner of the new leader in Bamako. However, the start of the war in Ukraine and Moscow’s greater focus on this arena changed everything. The 2023 mutiny by the Wagner Group, which was followed by the death of its head Yevgeny Prigozhin, destabilized its support capacities.

The Russian state quickly took over all the Wagner Group’s overseas operations and shifted them to the Africa Corps, giving them a more institutional and formal structure. Nevertheless, it is clear now that Moscow, just like France before it, has not been able to fully consolidate its influence following the French and Western withdrawal.

Five years ago, the request to leave Mali was addressed to the French. Today, the FLA is demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces from the country. Yet, as shown by the picture posted online by Goita’s office of him meeting the Russian ambassador last week, the Malian authorities will continue to rely on the military support of the Africa Corps.

It is clear now that Moscow, just like France before it, has not been able to fully consolidate its influence

Khaled Abou Zahr

On the ground, it is a repeat of the 2012 and 2013 crises, as fighting continues. There have been Malian airstrikes and clashes in several regions in the north and center of the country. If these areas slip out of central governmental control, who will be able to stabilize the situation? Are we heading to a de facto division of the country despite claims to the contrary by the junta? Moreover, what if, as the rebels are stating, the regime is about to fall?

There is a lot of finger-pointing not only between the Russians and the French, but also within both camps. French media outlets have, without absolving the previous French interventions, blamed the current catastrophic situation on the Malian coup leaders. Their accusations are linked to the imprisonment of political opponents and banning of political parties and journalistic work.

Obviously, they have also blamed the alliance with Russian mercenaries for fueling a bloody drift toward war. And they highlight that only a political solution can allow Mali to escape its current impasse. However, the real question is not asked: if a political solution is the only outcome, why did France not push for this when it held all the cards? And why did it allow the previous regime to do the same? 

Pragmatism is the answer. It is easier said than done, especially when economic interests are involved and the rebels are affiliated with extremist groups that France and the West oppose on a global scale. While France is weakened in Africa and Russia faces increasing difficulties in pushing for a decisive outcome, a negotiated political settlement with the northern communities under the current pressure remains highly unlikely. The most probable trajectory is continued fragmentation and a multi-actor war resembling Syria or Afghanistan, depending on the lens applied.

As a result, while the population continues to suffer, the risks of state collapse and de facto partition are becoming increasingly prominent, with the spillover risks to neighboring countries also rising. With no external actor able to replicate the influence once held by France and Russia, and only limited US support and Algerian mediation remaining, the situation has become a fragmented stalemate in which everyone is losing.

• Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.