Gulf’s evolving ties with Iraqi Kurdistan signal a strategic shift
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The Gulf Cooperation Council has officially invited the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq to take part in its meetings. The invitation was extended by GCC Secretary-General Jasem Albudaiwi during his meeting with Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani on the sidelines of last week’s World Government Summit in Dubai. This is an important development that illustrates how the GCC is seeking to play a potentially important and emerging role in Iraqi Kurdistan, which is perceived as a stable and prosperous region that the Gulf countries want to invest in.
The past decade has seen a deepening of ties between the KRG and the GCC. The UAE was the first Gulf country to open a consulate in Irbil in 2012. This was followed by Kuwait in 2015 and then Saudi Arabia in 2016. Qatar opened its consulate in 2023, while Bahrain and Oman are yet to have a high-level representation there. Although Irbil lacks a diplomatic presence in the Gulf capitals, there have been recent discussions regarding establishing a Kurdish paradiplomatic office in the UAE.
Abu Dhabi has the most extensive diplomatic and political ties with the KRG and is one of the largest investors in postwar Iraq, with much of the funding going to Kurdistan. In 2014, Dubai’s Chamber of Commerce opened an office in Irbil to support some Emirati companies that were already registered with the KRG. Qatar has also rolled up its sleeves to invest significantly in the autonomous region’s burgeoning energy and infrastructure sectors.
However, several developments have disrupted the coherence of GCC-KRG relations. First was Daesh’s rise to prominence in Iraq in 2014. Back in 2013, Irbil was supposed to be a major center of tourism for the region that aimed to attract Gulf tourists; however, Daesh’s presence harmed the tourism tool that could foster relations. Secondly, intra-GCC divisions led to differing policies being pursued by its member states, creating an obstacle for a common strategy toward Irbil.
Kurdish leaders have been paying frequent trips to the Gulf countries since the normalization wave in the region
Sinem Cengiz
Thirdly, the Iraqi Kurds suffered significant political, diplomatic and economic setbacks after holding an independence referendum in 2017 at a time of heightened turmoil in the region, marked by the fight against Daesh and rivalries among regional powers. Fourthly, intra-Kurdish divisions have also hampered the possibility of a comprehensive framework for KRG-GCC relations being drawn up. Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic set back the infrastructure and investment plans of the Gulf countries in Kurdistan.
However, the end of the intra-GCC divisions provided room for stronger interactions between the KRG and the Gulf states, depending on their varying degree of involvement in Irbil. Kurdish leaders have been paying frequent trips to the Gulf countries since the normalization wave in the region. Barzani’s visit to the UAE and Qatar in 2022 was significant in showing his government’s balancing policy in the sense of maintaining cordial relations with each party.
From the Gulf perspective, a political will from the regional bloc’s leadership is significant in terms of moving forward with economic and social relations with Irbil. These burgeoning relations serve the “Vision” plans of the Gulf countries. Each GCC member has been pursuing diversification strategies to varying degrees. The variations in the pace of their plans are likely to bring more bilateral or trilateral arrangements with the KRG, rather than a unified GCC engagement.
For instance, the UAE is the second-largest investor in Iraqi Kurdistan, providing 25 percent of foreign direct investment, trailing only China. In a concerted effort to fortify their investment, trade and economic ties, Abu Dhabi and Irbil have proposed the establishment of a UAE-Kurdistan economic council. The other Gulf countries can follow a similar path to coordinate their economic ties with the KRG.
It is noteworthy to mention the alleged involvement of Iraqi Kurds in the rapprochement between Turkiye and the Gulf states
Sinem Cengiz
Given the thaw between Turkiye and the Gulf countries, there is also the prospect of Turkiye-KRG-GCC triangular cooperation that could shift the region’s geopolitical and geoeconomic environments. It is noteworthy to mention the alleged involvement of Iraqi Kurds in the rapprochement between Turkiye and the Gulf states, particularly the UAE. Despite several reports claiming that the Irbil leadership played a key role in initiating direct talks between Ankara and Abu Dhabi, it is hard to know the extent of its involvement.
Infrastructural projects could be instrumental in bringing Gulf capital to Iraqi Kurdistan. However, such projects might also face substantial challenges, including internal Kurdish divisions, Baghdad’s objection and the risk of Iranian reactions against both Irbil and the Gulf.
Within this context, it is important to mention the Iranian factor in the burgeoning KRG-GCC relations, which is likely to also give space for Turkiye’s involvement. It is hard to argue that Irbil-Gulf ties will not clash with Iranian interests in Iraq and the Kurdish government. However, growing regional dialogue and de-escalation initiatives carried out by the KRG and the GCC could help mitigate Iran’s proxy involvements in the region. Improving Irbil-Gulf relations, which are shaped by political, economic and security factors, could also help in crystalizing the Gulf countries’ Iraq policy.
The Gulf countries are currently neither engaging on an ad hoc basis — as opposed to being proactive players in Iraqi Kurdistan — nor are they pursuing assertive policy that could provoke Iran. They are adopting a cautious but determined approach to assess the viability of projects, along with how the political environment in Baghdad and Irbil develops. The GCC’s invitation of the KRG to its meetings could be read within this broader context.
• Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz
