From interim deal to a permanent regional agreement

Critics had a field day last week when President Donald Trump signed the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran. Some picked on the US agreeing to lift sanctions, allowing Iran to resume exporting oil, withdrawing forces from its vicinity, and releasing its frozen assets.

Some focused on the agreement’s implicit acceptance of an Iranian role in managing the Strait of Hormuz. This is the issue most Gulf commentators criticized, plus they were livid at the apparent suggestion in the agreement that “regional partners” would provide some funds toward Iran’s development and reconstruction, even though those partners were the ones attacked by Iran, not the other way round.

Trump signed the document at the Palace of Versailles outside Paris in front of the G7 leaders, their guests and the media. The palace is famous for hosting a year-long peace conference at the end of the First World War. It was also the place where the League of Nations was born in 1920. The triumphal theatrics of the signing ceremony served as an invitation to pick apart the agreement and highlight its weaknesses and loopholes.

The signing ceremony came at about the same time Trump scathingly criticized Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for trying to derail negotiations and sabotage the deal by ignoring the ceasefire the US had brokered in Lebanon. The president also accused The New York Times of “treason” for its coverage of the deal and threatened a lawsuit for publishing what he described as fake news.

The theatrics of the signing ceremony served as an invitation to pick apart the agreement and highlight its weaknesses

Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

The Israelis were also angered by Trump’s invitation for Syria to help the Lebanese government take on Hezbollah, because he said Netanyahu knows only how to kill and destroy, which is not the right way to solve this problem.

Israel was also excluded from joining the bodies set up to negotiate the implementation of the agreement. For example, the High-Level Committee, which met at Burgenstock, Switzerland, on Monday to draw up a roadmap toward reaching a final deal within 60 days, included the US and Iran, plus the mediators Pakistan and Qatar, but not Israel. In addition, the parties agreed on the creation of a deconfliction cell for Lebanon, without Israel’s participation, to “ensure the adherence of the termination of military operations in Lebanon as per the MoU,” according to a statement issued at the end of the meeting.

All these elements whetted the appetite of the critics, especially those close to Israel. Making matters worse for the US administration, which was trying to portray the deal as a singular success, every time Trump said that Tehran had agreed to some major concessions, Iranian officials rejected those claims.

Much of the criticism voiced by Gulf commentators was motivated by the appearance that the agreement is heavily slanted toward Iran, giving too many concessions to Tehran without clear guarantees that it will keep its end of the bargain.

To be fair to the administration’s efforts, one must keep in mind that this is not a final agreement but a temporary negotiating framework, accompanied by a clear American threat to resume war more ferociously than before if Iran delays or fails to fulfill its obligations under the agreement.

In addition, there are at least two provisions that are important for Gulf Cooperation Council countries: the ceasefire for 60 days that is extendable and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. The truce is needed to stop attacks on the Gulf countries and allow them to bolster their missile and drone defenses. It is also necessary for the conclusion of a final deal. Reopening the waterway is essential to save the global economy from a catastrophic slowdown, accompanied by price rises not seen in many years.

The final deal, when properly negotiated, could serve as the first step toward a genuine regional dialogue in all areas

Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg

What is probably more important than finding fault with a temporary arrangement is trying to shape the final deal to produce a durable win-win and fully take into account the GCC states’ interests, including the following priorities.

First, the final deal must include a commitment to return the Strait of Hormuz to its status quo ante, without impediments, delays or tolls, according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

Second, in addition to dealing with Iran’s nuclear, missile and drone programs, the agreement must address Tehran’s regional proxies, which have undermined the states in which they operate, including Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

Third, the final deal needs to include fair compensation, according to international law, for the damage inflicted by Iran’s attacks on GCC states.

Fourth, GCC countries must be part of the negotiations on the final deal and any future political, economic or security arrangements for the region.

Fifth, discussing investment and regional integration can take place only in an atmosphere of trust, which has been shattered by Iran’s attacks on GCC states. Accepting these priorities will go a long way toward restoring that trust between Iran and its Gulf neighbors and enabling trade and investment decisions to be made.

Regardless of the apparent shortcomings of the interim memorandum, the final deal, when properly negotiated, could serve as the first step toward a genuine regional dialogue in all areas. This dialogue should be based on the globally recognized principles enshrined in the UN Charter, including respect for the sovereignty of states, noninterference in their internal affairs and refraining from the use of force or threats.

Resorting to diplomacy instead of war and ensuring the peaceful settlement of conflicts will pave the way for real cooperation between Iran and its neighbors for the benefit of the peoples on the two shores of the Gulf, who will reap the benefits of normalizing relations in the form of shared prosperity, peace and stability.

• Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiation. The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily represent those of the GCC.

X: @abuhamad1