Space is the new strategic high ground

If there was any doubt left, we now know with certainty that if or when a major direct conflict happens between the leading powers of the world, it will extend to or even start in space. There is a certain logic to this: as technology has progressed, war has extended from land to sea, air, subsurface, cyberspace and now space. Understandably, with every leap forward, superiority in the new battlefield becomes the key element in victory. Today, cyberspace and space have become the key elements in any war.

Governments and their militaries understand that space is a critical operational domain for national security. Hence, there has been a rapid global expansion of military space organizations. Russia led this new wave by creating the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2015, integrating air and space operations under a single command. India established its Defence Space Agency in 2018.

In 2019, there were two landmark developments: America created the US Space Force, the world’s first independent military service dedicated to space, while France established its Space Command. The momentum persisted. In 2020, Japan formed its Space Operations Squadron, followed by the UK and Germany launching dedicated space commands in 2021. Australia and South Korea created their military space commands and operational units in 2022.

Governments and their militaries understand that space is a critical operational domain for national security

Khaled Abou Zahr

 

Most recently, China restructured its military in 2024 and created the People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force, elevating military space operations to a dedicated organizational level. Together, these developments illustrate a global shift toward treating space as a distinct warfighting domain.

This trend coincided with the resurgence of geopolitical tensions between the transatlantic alliance and Russia and, to a lesser extent, China in various theaters. But it also builds on a much longer history of military space organizations.

The US was the first country to institutionalize military space operations by establishing its Air Force Space Command in 1982, followed by the original US Space Command in 1985, to coordinate military activities in space. Throughout the Cold War, military space activities were largely concentrated on satellite communications, navigation, missile-warning systems and intelligence, with space capabilities embedded within air forces or strategic commands rather than separate organizations. France began developing dedicated military space structures in the early 2000s, while Russia inherited extensive Soviet military space capabilities before reorganizing them in 2015.

For decades, military space was viewed primarily as an enabling function supporting terrestrial operations. However, the growing strategic importance of satellite resilience, antisatellite weapons, space domain awareness and orbital security has fundamentally changed this perception, prompting countries to establish dedicated commands and, in some cases, independent services to organize, protect and, if necessary, conduct military operations in space.

The threat is becoming clearer. In the case of France, for example, it was the 2017 attempt by a Russian satellite to spy on a French intelligence satellite that prompted its move. This led to the development of BA 101, the codename of the first French military space airbase in Toulouse, which has been operational since July last year.

Military satellites allow armed forces to communicate securely around the world, observe military movements, guide precision weapons, detect missile launches and track objects in orbit. The US operates the world’s largest and most advanced military satellite network, followed by China and Russia. Other major space powers include France, the UK, Germany, India, Japan, Israel, South Korea, Italy and Australia. NATO increasingly relies on a combination of national systems and allied capabilities.

Several countries have also developed counterspace capabilities designed to interfere with or disable an adversary’s space assets during a conflict. These capabilities range from temporarily disrupting satellite communications or navigation signals through electronic or cyber means to physically damaging or destroying satellites using antisatellite weapons.

The US, China and Russia possess the broadest range of publicly known counterspace capabilities, including electronic warfare, cyber operations, direct-ascent antisatellite missiles and technologies that can maneuver close to other satellites in orbit. India has also demonstrated antisatellite capability through a missile test.

The US operates the world’s largest and most advanced military satellite network, followed by China and Russia

Khaled Abou Zahr

Several other nations are, for this reason, focused on investing in defensive and other means to protect themselves. France follows the doctrine known as “active defense.” This principle is built around protecting satellites from threats such as espionage, jamming and even destruction.  

Looking ahead, it is clear that hostile actions in space are becoming more frequent, especially in the context of accelerating the militarization of space and the absence of a real rule of law in space. The major space powers are shifting their focus from operating a limited number of large, expensive satellites to deploying large constellations of smaller, more resilient spacecraft that are harder to disable.

The US is investing heavily in proliferated military satellite networks, advanced missile-warning systems and an expanded Space Force. China is rapidly expanding its military satellite constellations, strengthening its space surveillance capabilities and developing technologies for in-orbit operations. Russia continues to modernize its military space infrastructure despite budgetary pressures.

Meanwhile, European countries, Japan, Australia, South Korea and India are expanding their space commands and increasing investment in space domain awareness, secure communications and sovereign satellite capabilities, reflecting a growing consensus that space will be a decisive operational domain in future conflicts.

In short, destroying or disabling satellites can effectively blind an enemy, as modern militaries rely on space systems to see, communicate, navigate and coordinate operations. Disrupting these capabilities will be a key target in future large-scale wars, as it creates confusion and reduces a military’s ability to respond effectively. Today, space is the new strategic high ground and it will shape warfare in this century and the next, just as air superiority shaped warfare in the 20th century.

• Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is the CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.